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Abstract
While cybersecurity has been an important issue for all business
sectors due to the rapid development of and reliance on technology
and the increasing sophistication of unlawful actors, it is particularly
significant for insurance companies because of the nature of the
industry. The internet makes it possible to collect and store massive
amounts of data, and this in turn requires the utmost confidence of
consumers in the companies collecting this data. The growing concern
for cyber risks has compelled insurance regulators to devise and
implement frameworks and rules for insurance companies to follow.
In the United States, insurance regulation is controlled by the states.
Invariably, the enthusiasm and speed of responses have been mixed.
New York has implemented the Cybersecurity Requirements for
Financial Services Companies, while South Carolina, Ohio,
Michigan, and Mississippi have passed laws based on the Insurance
Data Security Model Law published by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a non-governmental entity
created and composed of insurance commissioners of each state and
territory. The specific provisions within these regulations differ, which
creates inconsistencies throughout the United States. As more states
adopt cyberspace policies regulating the insurance industry, the
divergence could worsen. This paper examines the NAIC Model
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Law and regulations in various states, as well as advocates for a
uniform standard across the United States based on the New York
regulations due to its robust nature.
I. Introduction
Cybersecurity is a necessity for all individuals, organizations, businesses,
and governmental agencies in today’s connected world. Threats or attacks
on one part of a network may be detrimental to a whole system due to the
Internet of Things. 1 The fastest growing crime in the United States,
cybercrimes are projected to cost US $6 trillion in damages worldwide in
2021, which has been characterized as “the greatest transfer of economic
wealth in history.” 2 Cyber crime is the fast growing crime in the United
States and is projected to cost . . . . The most targeted industries for
cybercrimes are healthcare, manufacturing, financial services, government,
and transportation. 3 The international cyber security market devoted to
protection from cyber attacks was valued at $136 billion in 2017, and the
total global insurance premium for cyber policies is estimated to reach US
$23 billion by 2025, up from roughly US$4 billion in 2019. 4
The potential for catastrophic financial losses caused by breaches of
cybersecurity has led many companies to purchase insurance designed to
cover liabilities resulting from an attack. 5 These cybersecurity insurance
Gerald Feltman, The Next Great Battlefront, in ISSUES IN MARITIME CYBER SECURITY 527,
530 (Joseph DiRenzo III, Nicole K. Drumhiller, & Fred S. Roberts eds., 2017).
2 Steve Morgan, Cybercrime Damages $6 Trillion By 2021, CYBERSECURITY VENTURES (Dec.
7, 2018) https://cybersecurityventures.com/cybercrime-damages-6-trillion-by-2021/.
3 Steve Morgan, 2019 Cybersecurity Almanac: 100 Facts, Figures, Predictions and Statistics,
CYBERSECURITY VENTURES (Feb. 6, 2019), https://cybersecurityventures.com/
cybersecurity-almanac-2019/.
4 Morris Beck, Global Cyber Security Market Analysis 2019 Dynamics, Trends, Revenue, Regional
Segmented, Outlook & Forecast Till 2025, INDUSTRY REPORTS (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://industryreports24.com/69485/global-cyber-security-market-analysis-2019dynamics-trends-revenue-regional-segmented-outlook-forecast-till-2025;
Bruce
Sussman, 5 Reasons Cyber Insurance Market Will Hit $23 Billion, SECURE WORLD (April 16,
2019), www.secureworldexpo.com/industry-news/5-reasons-cyber-insurance-marketwill-hit-23-billion.
5 Be that as it may, it has been reported that 68% of businesses in the United States “have
not purchased any form of cyber liability of data-breach coverage.” At a Glance: Cyber
Security and Insurance, CISCO, www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/
enterprise-networks/cybersecurity-solutions/cyber-security-insurance-aag.pdf
(last
visited June 4, 2019). For more information on cyber risk insurance, see, e.g., Christopher
C. French, Insuring Against Cyber Risk: The Evolution of an Industry (Introduction), 122 PENN
ST. L. REV. 607 (2019); Mark Camillo, Cyber Risk and the Changing Role of Insurance, 2 J.
1
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policies usually mandate that the policyholders maintain proper
preventative measures and follow best practice guidelines in order for
cyber risk coverage to be maintained. 6 While the insurers are mandating
the insureds to take measures to be secure, it may be pertinent to ask
whether the insurers themselves are maintaining cyber resilience. 7 In other
words, what are insurance companies doing about their own cybersecurity?
The answer depends on where the insurance company is located, as
insurance regulation varies by jurisdiction. The focus of this paper is on
the United States. Due to the unique historical development of insurance
regulation in the United States, the industry is mostly regulated by the
individual states. 8 Consequently, the regulations by which the companies
must abide are promulgated by state legislatures and enforced by state
regulatory agencies, resulting in disparate standards across the country.
Though the insurance industry trade organization, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (hereinafter “NAIC”), serves as
a national standard setting agency that seeks to harmonize insurance
regulatory rules, it does not necessarily have the power to make
harmonization mandatory. 9 Nonetheless, in the past couple of years, some
CYBER POL’Y 53 (2017); Margaret A. Reetz et al., Cyber Risks: Evolving Threats, Emerging
Coverages, and Ensuing Case Law, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 727 (2018). For a discussion on
how cyber insurance can regulate the behaviour of the insureds, see Shauhin A. Talesh,
Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance Companies Act as “Compliance
Managers” for Businesses, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 417 (2018). For the content of cyber
insurance policies, see Sasha Romanosky, Lillian Ablon, Andreas Kuehn & Therese Jones,
Content Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies: How Do Carriers Price Cyber Risk?, 5 J.
CYBERSECURITY (2019).
6 Cybersecurity Insurance, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, www.dhs.gov/cisa/
cybersecurity-insurance (last visited Sept. 22, 2019); see Rachael M. Peters, So You’ve Been
Notified, Now What? The Problem With Current Data-Breach Notification Laws, 56 ARIZ. L. REV.
1171, 1199–1201 (2014).
7 While this paper uses the term “insurer,” it should be noted that the regulations
discussed herein are applicable to all entities regulated by the state insurance departments,
unless explicitly excluded, including insurers, brokers, and agents.
8 See infra Section III.
9 The NAIC has long had an identity crisis. It originally identified itself as a private trade
organization but eventually decided that it had characteristics of both “a group of public
officials imbued with the public trust” and “an instrumentality of the states.” Susan
Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 638 (1999) (citing L.H.
Otis, Just What Is the NAIC? Legal Status Up for Grabs, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Prop.
& Cas./Risk & Benefits Mgmt. ed.), May 22, 1995, at 3). Randall affirms that the NAIC
is a “completely self-governing entity” that has “no power to compel the states or the
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states, with New York leading the way, have begun to take the problem of
cybersecurity seriously, and are mandating insurance companies doing
business in their jurisdictions to follow cybersecurity guidelines. 10 The
NAIC has also promulgated the Insurance Data Model Law (hereinafter
“NAIC Model Law”) for states to model after when drafting their own
cybersecurity regulations. 11
This paper examines the various cybersecurity regulations that have
been passed as law in the United States, with a focus on New York’s
Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies
(hereinafter “NYDFS regulations”) and the NAIC Model Law, Further, it
argues that the hodgepodge of current regulations creates gaps in the
regulatory ecosystem, which could potentially be exploited by
opportunistic cybercriminals. To minimize this threat, more effort should
be expended to harmonize states’ regulations with the NYDFS regulations
as the model because the latter is the strictest set of regulations that has
been passed in the United States thus far.
Section II of this paper provides an introduction of different types of
cyber attacks. Section III discusses the nature of insurance regulation in
the United States where states, along with the NAIC, possess most of the
regulatory power. Section IV examines the NYDFS regulations, the NAIC
Model Law, and other insurance cybersecurity regulations in place
modeled after the NAIC Model Law. It then highlights their deficiencies
and advocates for harmonization to achieve stronger cyber resilience in
the insurance industry. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. Cyber Attacks
Anybody could be the victim of cyber attacks; however, insurance
companies in particular may be targeted due to the vast amounts of

industry.” Id. But see Daniel Schwarcz, Is US Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional?, 25 CONN.
INS. L.J. 191 (2018). This will be further discussed in infra Section III.
10 See Sara Merken, States Imposing New Cybersecurity Requirements on Insurers, BLOOMBERG
LAW (April 4, 2019, 2:48 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-datasecurity/states-imposing-new-cybersecurity-requirements-on-insurers.
11 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES
(NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, VOLUME V) (2018) (hereinafter “NAIC MODEL LAW”).
Kosseff argues that the federal government should be leading the charge on cybersecurity
as state regulation is not adequate. See generally Jeff Kosseff, Hamiltonian Cybersecurity, 54
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155. (2019).
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valuable data they possess. 12 Cyber attacks are crimes that are “somehow
related to the misuse of computers.” 13 Cybercrime as a term is flexible,
and may encompass different actions to different people. 14 Gordon and
Ford divide cybercrimes into two broad categories, Type I and Type II.
Type I has the following characteristics:
1. It is generally a singular, or discrete, event from the
perspective of the victim.
2. It often is facilitated by the introduction of crimeware
programs such as keystroke loggers, viruses, rootkits, or Trojan
horses into the user’s computer system.
3. The introductions can, but may not necessarily, be facilitated
by vulnerabilities. 15

Type II, on the other hand, has the following characteristics:
1. It is generally facilitated by programs that do not fit under the
classification crimeware. For example, conversations may take
place using IM (Instant Messaging) clients or files may be
transferred using the FTP protocol.
2. There are generally repeated contacts or events from the
perspective of the user. 16

Though individuals and government agencies are undoubtedly targets of cybercrimes
in addition to businesses, the focus here is on the threats facing commercial entities. As
such, issues related to cyberwarfare are outside the scope of this paper. For an
introduction of cyberwarfare, see CYBER WARFARE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS
(James A. Green ed., 2015); Pauline C. Reich et al., Cyber Warfare: A Review of Theories, Law,
Policies, Actual Incidents - and the Dilemma of Anonymity, 1 EUR. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2010); Peter
Margulies, Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks: Technology’s Challenge to the Law of State Responsibility,
14 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1 (2013).
13 David S. Wall, The Internet as a Conduit for Criminal Activity, in INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (April Pattavina ed., 2005).
14 For a discussion on the qualitative differences between cybercrimes and traditional
crimes, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1003
(2001).
15 Sarah Gordon & Richard Ford, On the Definition and Classification of Cybercrime, 2 J.
COMPUTER VIROLOGY 13, 14 (2006).
16 Id. at 15. “FTP is short for File Transfer Protocol. A protocol is a set of rules that
networked computers use to talk to one another. And FTP is the language that computers
on a TCP/IP network (such as the internet) use to transfer files to and from each other.”
Pamela Statz, FTP for Beginners, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2010, 8:45 PM), https://www.wired.com
/2010/02/ftp_for_beginners/.
12
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Another way to classify cybercrimes is to divide them into two
principles categories: cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes. 17 The
former are “crimes that can only be committed using a computer,
computer networks, or other form of information communications
technology” and are “primarily directed against computers or network
resources.” 18 Cyber-enabled crimes, by contrast, are “traditional crimes
that are increased in their scale or reach by the use of computers, computer
networkers, or other information communications technology” and do
not require the use of information communications technology to
effectuate. 19That being said, it is believed that cybercrimes fall on a
continuum with technology crimes on one end, and people crimes on the
other. 20 Indeed, cybersecurity is not just information security and “is not
necessarily only the protection of cyberspace itself, but also the protection
of those that function in cyberspace, and any of their assets that can be
reached via cyberspace.” 21
Cyber attacks can manifest themselves in many different forms. 22
Malware is malicious software that is installed in one’s system through
opening attachments or clicking links embedded with them. 23 Malware can
block access to the system unless a ransom is paid, install malicious
software, transmit data to the perpetrators, and render the system
17 JONATHAN CLOUGH, PRINCIPLES OF CYBERCRIME 10-11 (2d ed. 2015). This
classification, or a form of it is used in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
18 MIKE MCGUIRE & SAMANTHA DOWLING, RESEARCH REPORT 75: CYBER CRIME: A
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE CH. 1-4 (2013).
19 Id. at CH. 2-4.
20 Gordon & Ford, supra note 15, at 15.
21 Rossouw von Solms & Johan van Niekerk, From Information Security to Cyber Security, 38
COMPUTER & SEC. 97, 101–03 (2013). But see Basie von Solms & Rossouw von Solms,
Cybersecurity and Information Security – What Goes Where?, 26 INFO. & COMPUTER SEC. 2
(2018).
22 The New York Department of Financial Services stated that from the notices they
have received, “the majority of successful breaches involve common software technology
used throughout business operations and have involved phishing attacks, social
engineering threats, and issues relating to password composition and security and email
security.” Maria T. Vullo, Department of Financial Services, Memorandum: DFS
Cybersecurity Regulation – First Two Years and Next Steps (Dec. 21, 2018), www.dfs.ny.gov/
system/files/documents/2019/01/cyber_memo_12212018.pdf. For more details on
different malware attack methods, see Aaron Emigh, The Crimeware Landscape: Malware,
Phishing, Identity Theft and Beyond, 1 J. DIGITAL FORENSIC PRACTICE 245 (2006).
23 What Are the Most Common Cyber Attacks?, CISCO, https://www.com/c/en/us/
products/security/common-cyberattacks.html (last visited June 4, 2019).
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inoperable. 24 Phishing is tricking the user into volunteering information by
sending legitimate-looking communications that ask for the input of
sensitive data. 25 Man in the middle attacks “occur when attackers insert
themselves into a two-party transaction” and steal data. 26 Denial of service
attacks send inordinate amounts of requests to the system to monopolize
resources so legitimate requests could not be fulfilled. 27 A Structured
Query Language (SQL) injection is when “an attacker inserts malicious
code into a server that uses SQL and forces the server to reveal
information it normally would not.” 28 Zero-day exploits are attacks that
occur in the window of time after vulnerabilities are announced, but
before solutions are implemented. 29 This is certainly not an exhaustive list,
and is merely illustrative of the types of cyber threats facing individuals
and corporations. Regardless of the mode of attack, it is generally agreed
that humans are the weakest link in cyber resilience. 30
III. Insurance Regulation in the U.S.
States oversee insurance regulation in the United States, a power
established by the 1868 U.S. Supreme Court case Paul v. Virginia. 31 In Paul,
the insurance industry sought to federalize insurance regulations because
the insurers were weary of abiding by the various regulations of multiple
states. 32 However, the insurance industry failed the legal challenge and
insurance regulation was kept under the purview of the states. Accepting
this fate, states began taking the task seriously and “[b]y the 1940s, state
regulation was fairly comprehensive.” 33 In 1944, the Supreme Court
reversed Paul in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association and
held that under the Commerce Clause, insurance companies are subject to
federal regulation. 34 The NAIC, which was founded as the National
Id.
Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Steve Culp, Cyber Risk: People Are Often the Weakest Link in the Security Chain, FORBES
(May 10, 2016), www.forbes.com/sites/steveculp/2016/05/10/cyber-risk-people-areoften-the-weakest-link-in-the-security-chain/.
31
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
32 Randall, supra note 9, at 630.
33 Id. at 632.
34 U.S. v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552–53 (1944).
24
25
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Insurance Convention in 1871 by representatives from the different state
insurance regulatory agencies, responded quickly to the opinion because it
was “viewed as an assault on state regulatory and tax authority over the
insurance industry.” 35 The NAIC proposed a bill, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, which states:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress
shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation
or taxation of such business by the several States. 36

The bill passed and mandated that, for laws related to insurance, there
would only be federal pre-emption if the federal law is specifically related
to the business of insurance and if the states do not regulate the business
of insurance. 37 To ensure that the states kept their authority, the NAIC
drafted model laws to demonstrate that the states were regulating
insurance, and—to preclude federal intervention—most states passed laws
based on the model laws. 38 Today, insurance regulation is by and large the
responsibility of the states, but the federal government does play a role in
certain areas in which it has explicitly chosen to do so. 39
The purposes of insurance regulation are: “ensuring fair pricing of
insurance, protecting insurance company solvency, preventing unfair
practices by insurance companies, and ensuring availability of insurance
coverage.” 40 The state regulatory body is an executive branch department,
or agency, headed by a commissioner or director of insurance. The
Randall, supra note 9, at 633.
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1945). For a history of the McCarranFerguson Act and the re-emergence of the states as the insurance regulator, see Charles
D. Weller, McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and
Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587 (1978).
37 For arguments supporting more federal involvement in insurance regulation, see
Christopher C. French, Dual Regulation of Insurance, 64 VILL. L. REV. 25, 57–70 (2019).
38 Id. at 58.
39 Id. at 45.
40 Randall, supra note 9, at 629. See French, supra note 37, at 33–37; Spencer L. Kimball,
The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45
MINN. L. REV. 471 (1961). For an overview of an important federal regulatory measure
to ensure the solvency of nonbank financial institutions, the establishment of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), see Christina Parajon Skinner, Regulating
Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 1379 (2017); see also Daniel Schwarcz &
David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
1813 (2017).
35
36
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Commissioner is usually appointed by the governor but is elected by the
people in some jurisdictions. 41 This state agency “has broad, legislatively
delegated powers to enforce state insurance laws, promulgate rules and
regulations, and conduct hearings to resolve disputed matters.” 42 Though
the power lies in this state agency, Schwarcz argues that “[i]n practice…the
most important and powerful entity in insurance regulation is, without
question, not a state at all,” but the NAIC. 43 He adds:
[T]he NAIC’s true power lies in its direct production of
insurance regulatory materials that have the force of law, a
category that includes over a dozen “handbooks” and
“manuals.” These materials dictate (among many other things)
the information that insurers and other regulated entities must
regularly report to regulators, the methodologies they must use
to determine their capital levels, and the accounting standards
that they must employ to calculate their assets and liabilities. 44

These materials have the force of law because the states have laws
mandating the insurance regulators and insurers adhere to these materials.
Additionally, “when the NAIC updates or changes any of its various
manuals… it also changes state insurance regulation” without going
through state legislatures. 45 As the next section will show, the NAIC is
playing a significant role in the realm of cybersecurity because the NAIC
Model Law has been the basis for legislation by the states.
IV. Cybersecurity Regulations for US Insurers
This section introduces the history and selected provisions of the
NYDFS regulations, the NAIC Model Law, and the regulations in other
states that have passed measures based on the NAIC Model Law. It then

Randall, supra note 9, at 629.
Id.
43 Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 193.
44 Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 193, 199–200.
45 Id. at 200. Schwarcz argues that this “violates the basic separation of powers and nondelegation principles embedded in every state constitution.” Id. at 202.
41
42
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discusses these regulations’ weaknesses, and advocates for harmonising
the regulations to ensure uniformity throughout the country.
A. New York
Examining the NYDFS regulations is an obvious starting point
because New York was the first state to pass cybersecurity regulations for
its insurers. It is not a coincidence that New York was the first to act. The
importance of New York as a financial centre necessitates it being an
industry leader, and its regulations can be influential upon other states. 46
Some have argued the NYDFS regulations could serve as the blueprint for
other states when drafting their own rules. 47
New York created the New York Department of Financial Services
(hereinafter “NYDFS”) in 2011 after the merger of the New York State
Banking Department and the New York State Insurance Department. The
NYDFS proposed cybersecurity regulations governing the banks and
insurance companies, the institutions it oversees, in September 2016. 48 It
was the first such proposal in the United States, and was later the model
for the NAIC Model Law. When the proposal was first introduced, it was
met with immediate criticism. It was derided as not “risk-based, flexible,
[or] workable” and the “required cybersecurity programs and policies did
not account for the amount of risk that a company faces.” 49 It was also
seen as overly broad. 50 Some found the equal treatment of all companies,
regardless of size for certain requirements, to be excessively burdensome
for smaller companies. 51
The NYDFS heeded the concerns and released new regulations in
December 2016 to be implemented on March 1, 2017. 52 The regulation
requires that entities covered by the NYDFS meet the mandated
Harry Dixon, Maintaining Individual Liability in AML and Cybersecurity at New York’s
Financial Institutions, 5 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 72, 75 (2017).
47 See generally Sabrina Galli, NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulations: A Blueprint for Uniform State
Statute?, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 235 (2018); Jeff Kosseff, New York’s Financial
Cybersecurity Regulation: Tough, Fair, and a National Model, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 436 (2017).
48 This paper refers to insurance companies, but it should be noted that the NYDFS
regulations affect banks and other financial institutions equally.
49 Kosseff, supra note 47, at 438.
50 See Galli, supra note 47, at 244.
51 Tracy Kitten, Critics Blast New York’s Proposed Cybersecurity Regulation, BANK INFO
SECURITY, (Oct. 14, 2016), www.bankinfosecurity.com/critics-blast-new-yorksproposed-cybersecurity-regulation-a-9453.
52 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, §§ 500.00–500.23 (2017). Id.
46
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cybersecurity standards. 53 A Covered Entity is defined as, “any person
operating under or required to operate under a license, registration,
charter, certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under the
Banking Law, the Insurance Law or the Financial Services Law.” 54 Section
500.02 mandates that the Covered Entity “shall maintain a cybersecurity
program designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of the Covered Entity’s Information Systems” that is “based on the
Covered Entity’s Risk Assessment.” 55 This cybersecurity program must
contain measures for continuous monitoring “designed to assess the
effectiveness” of the program, or engage in “periodic Penetration Testing
and vulnerability assessments.” 56 Entities are also required to “implement
and maintain a written policy or policies . . . setting forth the Covered
Entity’s policies and procedures for the protection of its Information
Systems and Nonpublic Information stored on those Information
Systems.” 57 There is a requirement of “conduct[ing] a periodic Risk
Assessment of the Covered Entity’s Information System sufficient to

Id.
Id. § 500.01(c).
55 Id. § 500.02(a)–(b); see generally id. § 500.01(e) (defining “Information System” as “a
discrete set of electronic information resources organized for the collection, processing,
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination or disposition of electronic information, as well
as any specialized system such as industrial/process controls systems, telephone
switching and private branch exchange systems, and environmental control systems.”).
56 Id. § 500.05.
57 Id. § 500.03; see generally id. § 500.01(g) (defining “Nonpublic Information” as “all
electronic information that is not Publicly Available Information and is: (1) Business
related information of a Covered Entity the tampering with which, or unauthorized
disclosure, access or use of which, would cause a material adverse impact to the business,
operations or security of the Covered Entity; (2) Any information concerning an
individual which because of name, number, personal mark, or other identifier can be used
to identify such individual, in combination with any one or more of the following data
elements: (i) social security number, (ii) drivers’ license number or non-driver
identification card number, (iii) account number, credit or debit card number, (iv) any
security code, access code or password that would permit access to an individual’s
financial account, or (v) biometric records; (3) Any information or data, except age or
gender, in any form or medium created by or derived from a health care provider or an
individual and that relates to (i) the past, present or future physical, mental or behavioral
health or condition of any individual or a member of the individual’s family, (ii) the
provision of health care to any individual, or (iii) payment for the provision of health care
to any individual.”). This definition differs from the one initially proposed. Galli, supra
note 47, at 244–45.
53
54
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inform the design of the cybersecurity program.” 58 The Covered Entities
are also required to appoint a Chief Information Security Officer tasked
with “overseeing and implementing the Covered Entity’s cybersecurity
program and enforcing its cybersecurity policy.” 59 The Chief Information
Security Officer is also responsible for “report[ing] in writing at least
annually to the Covered Entity’s board of directors or equivalent
governing body.” 60
In addition, the Covered Entity must:
[E]stablish a written incident response plan designed to
promptly respond to, and recover from, any Cybersecurity
Event materially affecting the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of the Covered Entity’s Information Systems or the
continuing functionality of any aspect of the Covered Entity’s
business or operations. 61

A Cybersecurity Event is defined as “any act or attempt, successful or
unsuccessful, to gain unauthorized access to, disrupt or misuse an
Information System or information stored on such Information
System.” 62 If a Cybersecurity Event were to occur, the Covered Entity
“shall notify the superintendent as promptly as possible but in no event
later than 72 hours from a determination that a Cybersecurity Event has
occurred.” 63
Some Covered Entities are exempt from certain sections of the
regulations: those with fewer than ten employees, those with less than five
million dollars in “gross annual revenue in each of the last three fiscal years
from New York business operations,” and those with less than ten million
dollars in “year-end total assets.” 64
These final regulations are noticeably more flexible and less stringent
than the initial proposal by the NYFDS. In the original draft, the
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.09(a) (2017).
Id. § 500.04(a).
60 Id. § 500.04(b).
61 Id. § 500.16.
62 Id. § 500.01(d).
63 Id. § 500.17(a). Section 500.17(a) requires notification only if the Cybersecurity Event
meets either of the following definitions: “(1) Cybersecurity Events impacting the
Covered Entity of which notice is required to be provided to any government body, selfregulatory agency or any other supervisory body; or (2) Cybersecurity Events that have a
reasonable likelihood of materially harming any material part of the normal operation(s)
of the Covered Entity.” Id.
64 Id. § 500.19(a).
58
59
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cybersecurity program had to contain a list of core functions, but did not
offer any leeway. In comparison, the final version clarifies that the
cybersecurity program “shall be based on the Covered Entity’s Risk
Assessment,” which suggests there is flexibility depending on the
company’s risk assessment. The same language was also added to the
section on Cybersecurity Policy in the final version to allow it to be based
on the company’s own risk assessment.
In terms of monitoring and testing the Risk Assessment, the original
proposal included, at a minimum, annual penetration testing and quarterly
vulnerability assessments. 65 In the final version, continuous monitoring
was added as an option, but if the option of penetration testing and
vulnerability assessments were chosen, the vulnerability assessment only
needs to be conducted bi-annually, and both the testing and the assessment
are done based on the Risk Assessment. While the Risk Assessment was
required to be performed at least once a year in the initial proposal, it only
needs to be “updated as reasonably necessary to address changes to the
Covered Entity’s Information Systems, Nonpublic Information or
business operations” in the final version. 66
Continuous monitoring means that ideally, security personnel would
always remain vigilant and be quick to identify vulnerabilities or attacks,
but it may also create a risk: the introduction of complacency.
Complacency can result from, inter alia, confirmation bias or
overfamiliarity. Confirmation bias is the “seeking or interpreting of
evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a
hypothesis in hand.” 67 If the same person or group of people are engaged
in continuous monitoring, the lack of any issues in the beginning may sway
them to subsequently look for similar evidence that signify the lack of
problems and disregard evidence that are contrary to the narrative.
Furthermore, possible cyber attacks could be missed, and as it has been
shown in various contexts, routine actions may result in higher risks due
to lack of vigilance. 68 For at least these two reasons, continuous
Id. § 500.05 (proposed Sept. 13, 2016).
Id. § 500.09(a).
67 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
68 See generally Maura Pilotti & Martin Chodorow, Does Familiarity with Text Breed
Complacency or Vigilance?, 35 J. RES. IN READING 204 (2012) (concluding that increased
familiarity with text when proofreading leads to an increased likelihood of overlooking
errors); Jeremy D. Davey et al., The Experiences and Perceptions of Heavy Vehicle Drivers and
65
66
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monitoring may lead to complacency, and vulnerabilities in the system not
being detected due to inertia.
By contrast, the requirement of annual testing and quarterly
assessments would mean that each task is discrete, and complacency could
be countered by using different procedures or personnel.. Nonetheless,
complacency could still remain a problem because it may be easier to
ignore a report than to run a continuing process Furthermore, if the
security team’s activity is paced by regular penetration test exercises, the
time between exercises might leave new vulnerabilities unmitigated for
quite some time. Instead of choosing between the two, both continuous
monitoring and annual testing plus quarterly assessments should be
required for compliance to ensure that insurers have robust cybersecurity
programs.
The requirement that the superintendent needs to be notified of
Cybersecurity Events was changed significantly from the original version,
which states:
Each Covered Entity shall notify the superintendent of any
Cybersecurity Event that has a reasonable likelihood of
materially affecting the normal operation of the Covered Entity
or that affects Nonpublic Information. The Covered Entity
must notify the superintendent as promptly as possible but in
no event later than 72 hours after becoming aware of such a
Cybersecurity Event. Such Cybersecurity Events include, but are
not limited to:
(1) any Cybersecurity Event of which notice is
provided to any government or self-regulatory agency;
(2) any Cybersecurity Event involving the actual or
potential unauthorized tampering with, or access to or
use of, Nonpublic Information. 69

The final version requires notification must be “as promptly as
possible but in no event later than 72 hours from a determination that a
Train Drivers of Dangers at Railway Level Crossings, 40 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
1217 (2008) (discussing driver complacency due to high levels of familiarity); H.L.
Hansen et al., Occupational Accidents Aboard Merchant Ships, 59 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL.
MED. 85 (2002) (observing that most accidents aboard ships occur when performing
routine duties); Ruth M.W. Yeung & Joe Morris, Food Safety Risk: Consumer Perception and
Purchase Behaviour, 103 BRIT. FOOD J. 170 (2001) (discussing the relationship between the
information provided about certain foods and the consumer’s willingness to purchase
that food).
69 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.17(a) (proposed Sept. 28, 2016).
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Cybersecurity Event has occurred.” 70 Furthermore, subsection (a)(2) was
changed to “Cybersecurity Events that have a reasonable likelihood of
materially harming any material part of the normal operations(s) of the
Covered Entity.” 71
The difference between “in no event later than 72 hours after
becoming aware of such a Cybersecurity Event” 72 and “in no event later
than 72 hours from a determination that a Cybersecurity Event has
occurred” 73 is significant. While the timeframe is identical, “becoming
aware” is a much lower threshold. Being aware of the attack requires
minimal effort, whereas making a determination may necessitate a
significant amount of time and effort from personnel to study and
investigate the problem before reaching the conclusion that the incident
was indeed a Cybersecurity Event. Commenting on section 500.17(a),
Brian Mund states:
A ‘determination’ connotes a high standard of certainty, and
goes far beyond mere suspicion of a potential cybersecurity
incident. The definition of ‘determination’ is instructive in this
regard: the New Oxford American Dictionary defines
‘determination’ as “the process of establishing something
exactly, typically by calculation or research.” However, one only
reaches a point of exactitude after investigative research.
Therefore, a determination transpires at some unspecified
time after the initial detection of a potential cybersecurity
breach. The current Regulation impliedly enables a regulated
entity’s response to disentangle these two events into discrete
stages—initial detection and determination—creating a buffer
extending the time before the Regulation’s 72 hours begin
tolling. 74

He contrasts “determination” with “initial detection,” which is roughly
equivalent to the awareness language in the initial proposal. 75 The current
regulation does create a temporal gap and allow for a large amount of
Id. § 500.17(a).
Id. § 500.17(a)(2).
72 Id. § 500.17(a).
73 Id. (proposed Sept. 13, 2016).
74 Brian Mund, The Problem with the New York Cybersecurity Guidelines, YALE J.L. TECH. BLOG
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://yjolt.org/blog/problem-new-york-cybersecurity-guidelines
(citations omitted).
75 Id.
70
71
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discretion, as determination is left undefined without any specific
guidance.
The deletion of “reasonable likelihood of materially affecting the
normal operation of the Covered Entity” also heightens the threshold for
reporting. Additionally, while the threshold in the original subsection (a)(2)
included the language “actual or potential unauthorized tampering with,
or access to or use of, Nonpublic Information,” it was amended to be
“reasonable likelihood of materially harming any material part of the
normal operations(s).” The original requirement allowed for potential
tampering and access, whereas the current regulation inserted the language
of materiality, requiring the standard of material harm of a material part.
The definition of material, again, is flexible, and could be defined by the
Covered Entity differently to avoid triggering the notice requirement
should it have the desire to obfuscate. Proponents of the materiality
language argue that it eliminates the need to report low level “cybersniffing” which “would be incredibly burdensome, and likely would divert
precious resources from addressing other more serious cyber-related
risks.” 76 The counterargument is that if such routine cyber-sniffing were
routine, generating a short report should not be time-consuming and
could become an automated process, with the upside being that the
NYDFS would have a complete record of attempted attacks.
Finally, the category of exempt entities was also broadened in the final
version. While the final regulations were worded in the alternative, the
entity must satisfy all the requirements in order to be exempt from certain
sections of the regulation in the initial proposal. Previously, the exempted
entities were those with “fewer than 1000 customers in each of the last
three calendar years,” have “less than $5,000,000 in gross annual revenue
in each of the last three fiscal years,” and have “less than $10,000,000 in
year-end total assets…including assets of all Affiliates.” In addition to
nixing the cumulative condition, the first criterion was changed from being
based on the number of customers to the number of employees; the
second requirement was amended to include gross annual revenue from
New York business operations only; and the third requirement eliminated
counting the total assets of affiliates. The new regulations appear to be
much easier to satisfy, meaning more insurers would be exempt from parts
New York Department of Financial Services Cybersecurity Rules Revised and Delayed, HOGAN
LOVELLS (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/
publication/2016/cybersecurity_alert_ny_department_of_financial_services_cybersecur
ity_rules_revised_and_delayed.pdf?la=en.
76
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of the NYDFS regulations. Nonetheless, proponents, insurers who
presumably would seek less regulation, have praised the regulation for “its
sensible, risk-based approach instead of an across-the-board, bright-line
rule that applies regardless of the actual risk of harm” and “provides an
incentive for companies to more effectively allocate their cybersecurity
resources.” 77 This new risk-based approach is also tied to the Risk
Assessment, making each plan tailored for each company’s situation. 78
Unsurprisingly, and to its credit for completeness, the regulatory
measures in the NYDFS regulations fit all four groups of responses
against cyber risks if viewing cybersecurity from a regulation perspective,
as proposed by Sales:
(1) monitoring and surveillance to detect malicious code, (2)
hardening vulnerable targets and enabling them to defeat
intrusions, (3) building resilient systems that can function during
attacks and recover quickly, and (4) responding in the aftermath
of attacks. 79

All in all, while the final regulations appear to be much more flexible,
it does offer a tremendous amount of wiggle room for the Covered
Entities. The flexibility may mean that the insurer can be nimbler in
designing plans specific to its situation or respond to any changing
conditions, and only notify the NYDFS when the attack is real and/or
caused harm as opposed to possible false alarms. This is a generous
reading of the situation and assumes that insurers would act in good faith
to combat the problem of cybercrimes. 80 From a more cynical perspective,
the current regulations compared to the initial proposal allow insurers to
define the undefined terms in ways that would serve their own best
interest, which may not be cyber resilience. Everything from the risk
assessment, determination, and continuous monitoring could be gamed so
that while the insurers’ obligations are low, the threshold to notify the
NYDFS are high. At this point, it is unclear whether the current
Kosseff, supra note 47, at 441–42.
New York Department of Financial Services Cybersecurity Rules Revised and Delayed, supra note
76.
79 Nathan A. Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2013).
80 FAQs: 23 NYCRR Part 500 – Cybersecurity, N.Y. ST. DEPT. OF FIN. SERVS., www.dfs.ny
.gov/industry_guidance/cyber_faqs (last visited June 4, 2019) (The New York DFS
“trusts that Covered Entities will exercise appropriate judgment as to which unsuccessful
attacks must be reported and does not intend to penalize Covered Entities for the
exercise of honest, good faith judgment”).
77
78
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regulations are sufficient, but the potential for abuse unquestionably exists
and compliance requires the insurers to act as good corporate citizens who
would abide by the spirit of the regulations. Jeff Kosseff suggests that the
NYDFS should “issue non-binding guidance that provides examples of
compliance with this risk-based framework,” and companies should
document their decision-making reasoning to avoid the NYDFS from
accusing them of insufficient safeguarding. 81 This suggestion is useful, but
for another reason also, which is that documenting the reasoning at every
step could show that the Covered Entities are making decisions in the best
interest of their cybersecurity and the cybersecurity of their customers
rather than for other nefarious interests such as, for example, protecting
their own reputations.
B. NAIC Model Law
The NAIC Model Law was adopted in October 2017 and is formally
entitled the Insurance Data Security Model Law. It has been endorsed by
the US Department of the Treasury. 82 The NAIC Model Law serves as
guidelines to the states to adopt in their own jurisdictions.83 Unlike the
NYDFS regulations, the NAIC Model Law only applies to insurers, and
excludes other types of financial institutions. The remainder of this
section addresses some of the differences between the NAIC Model Law
and the NYDFS regulations.
The definitions of Cybersecurity Event differ between the NAIC
Model Law and the NYDFS regulations. The former states that a Cyber
Security event means: “[A]n event resulting in unauthorized access to,
disruption or misuse of, an Information System or information stored on
such Information System.”84 It then includes two scenarios that would
Kosseff, supra note 47, at 442. The New York DFS has issued a memorandum and
maintains a FAQ page on its website that contain further guidance on the regulations.
None of the other states mentioned in this paper have issued any formal guidance thus
far. Vullo, supra note 22; N.Y. ST. DEPT. OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 80.
82 Don Jergler, The State of NAIC’s Data Security Model Law, Insurance Journal, INSURANCE
JOURNAL (Sept. 21 2018), www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/09/21/500
119.htm.
83 Kim Mobley & Carly Kanwisher, Impact of NAIC’s Insurance Data Security Model Law,
JOHNSON LAMBERT BLOG (July 2018), www.johnsonlambert.com/post/impact-of-naics
-insurance-data-security-model-law/.
84 NAIC INSURANCE DATA SECURITY MODEL LAW § 3(D) (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 2017).
81
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not be defined as a Cybersecurity Event, exemptions not in the NYDFS
regulations. The definition does not include “the unauthorized acquisition
of Encrypted Nonpublic Information if the encryption, process or key is
not also acquired, released or used without authorization” or “an event
with regard to which the Licensee has determined that the Nonpublic
Information accessed by an unauthorized person has not been used or
released and has been returned or destroyed.”85 This is a much more
exclusive standard than that of the NYDFS regulations, as it appears to
exclude unsuccessful attacks, because there is no language on potential
attacks and it has two further exemptions as noted above.
These exemptions appear to create loopholes. Encryption is the
bedrock of cyber security. 86 It is “the conversion of data from a readable
format into an encoded format that can only be read or processed after
it’s been decrypted.” 87 The encrypted data is unintelligible and can only be
read if a key or cipher is used to unscramble the information. 88 If the
encrypted data is stolen, it is incomprehensible and useless without the key
or means to decrypt it. 89 Burdon and his colleagues note that “[t]he
apparent benefit of cryptography is that it substitutes the problem of
protecting the secrecy of a potentially large amount of plaintext, for the
problem of protecting the secrecy of a much smaller key.” 90

Id.
Encryption has been the subject of debate between law enforcement and the
technology industry because the former has been advocating for the latter to assist in
their investigations by “provid[ing] backdoors or assistance when users encrypt their
communications.” Shannon Gross, A Mystery Wrapped in an Encryption: Surveillance and
Privacy in the Encrypted Era, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 74 (2017). Although the
general concern has been about user privacy, the existence of backdoors could create
another point of vulnerability that hackers could target and exploit. Stephanie K. Pell,
You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get What It Needs in a PostCALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599, 609–10 (2016).
87 What is Data Encryption?, KASPERSKY, www.kaspersky.com/resource-center/
definitions/encryption (last visited June 4, 2019). One federal bill defined encryption as
“the protection of data in electronic form in storage or in transit using an encryption
technology that has been adopted by an established standards setting body which renders
such data indecipherable in the absence of associated cryptographic keys.” Data Security
and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. § 6(6) (2015). 139 § 13(4).
Encryption is not defined by the NYDFS regulations.
88 What is Data Encryption?, supra note 87
89 WENBO MAO, MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (2004).
90 Mark Burdon, Jason Reid & Rouhshi Low, Encryption Safe Harbours and Data Breach
Notification Laws, 26 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 520, 522 (2010).
85
86
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The first exemption states that if only the scrambled data is stolen and
not the key to decipher it, the event would not trigger the notification
requirement of the law. 91 This is known as the encryption safe harbor and
is common among existing data security laws. 92 There are two main
rationales for including encryption safe harbor provisions:
First, to reduce the risks of notification fatigue and the
regulatory compliance burden on organisations and regulators,
by requiring notification only in circumstances where there is an
appreciable risk of identity fraud. Second, to encourage both
private and public sector organisations to adopt encryption
technologies for the collection and storage of personal
information thus strengthening their information security
management practices. 93

The safe harbour provision acts as “an adjunct to the primary aim of
the laws, the mitigation of identity theft crimes, and has been developed
as a counterbalance to corporate fears of the compliance implications of
over-notification that potentially conflict with the consumer protection
aims of data breach notification laws.” 94
Both rationales may be facially valid, but they do create more risk than
if the exemption did not exist. In fact, the reliance on encryption and push
for its use may be misplaced due to its “two fundamental limitations as a
security technology. First, encryption can protect data at rest and in
motion but cannot protect data while the data is actually being processed.
Second, encryption is only as secure as the weakest link in the system
within which it is deployed.” 95
Under the NAIC Model Law, if an attack did not include the
acquisition of “the encryption, process, or key,” but a subsequent attack
See Samuel Lee, Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and Data Safeguarding
Now Apply to Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. 125, 133
(2006) (stating California does not require notification where personal information is
encrypted).
92 Id. at 143 (stating California “essentially serve[s] as a de-facto standard”).
93 Burdon et al., supra note 90, at 520. Burdon notes that “the use of encryption
exemptions is directly linked to corporate compliance cost reduction and the
development of market incentives to enhance corporate information security measures.”
Mark Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of Information Privacy and Data
Breach Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 89 (2010).
94 Burdon, supra note 93, at 92.
95 Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification Laws Possible, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1133, 1146 (2009).
91
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led to its acquisition, would this be considered a Cybersecurity Event? The
two attacks combined would be considered a Cybersecurity Event under
the definition, but each one on its own would not be. Depending on
whether the definition has been met, the response would be different, yet,
the damages incurred would probably be similar. Is there a temporal limit
to the definition of a Cybersecurity Event? Can multiple assaults be
considered different stages of one Cybersecurity Event? How should the
continuous exploitation of the same vulnerability be classified? The same
mode of attack could either trigger the investigation reporting
requirements or not—purely depending on how each insurer interprets
the regulations and its obligations. In addition, the encryption on the
stolen data may have been decrypted by alternate means without the need
for the key. 96 This would undoubtedly be the unauthorized use of
Nonpublic Information that could lead to massive amounts of damages,
yet the existence of the safe harbor provision means that the state
insurance commissioner would not have to be informed in this type of
breach. 97
The second exemption means that an acquisition of Nonpublic
Information is not considered a Cybersecurity Event if the information
were not used for nefarious purposes or released publicly, and has been
returned or destroyed. As the object of theft is information, it could not
be truly destroyed. One copy may be, but the information could have been
replicated and stored elsewhere. Similarly, the data may have been returned
but the NAIC Model Law is silent on the perpetrator keeping a copy,
which could be used or released later. Though the attack may not be a
Cybersecurity Event at first, it becomes one when it is released or used at
a subsequent time. This raises the same temporal limit issue and the
question of why the investigation and reporting requirements are not
triggered the first time around, when there was obviously a vulnerability
that was exploited leading to the theft of the Nonpublic Information.
Limiting reporting to only when customer data is jeopardized for certain
also misses the point of cybersecurity, which “refers to the integrity of a
technological system” and “is more broadly focused on attacks on

96 Kerr and Schneier note three types of encryption workarounds that can be used to
decrypt data in the context of law enforcement, but they warn that these same methods
can be used for more nefarious purposes too. Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption
Workarounds, 106 GEO. L.J. 989, 995–96, 1005–11 (2018).
97 See Burdon et al., supra note 90, at 526–31.
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networks and systems, in addition to information.” 98 Just because the data
was not compromised in the attack does not mean the attacker did not
find a vulnerability in the system that could be exploited again to mount
other types of attacks that could not only lead to the release of the data
but also threaten the technological infrastructure. Mandating the report of
the first attack, however innocuous it may seem, is a good information
sharing practice that could spur more coordinated responses at the outset.
Excluding the above, the NAIC Model Law is substantially similar to
the NYDFS regulations, though it is more detailed in certain sections. The
NAIC Model Law mandates the implementation of an Information
Security Program to “mitigate the identified risks, commensurate with the
size and complexity of the Licensee’s activities,” 99 implement appropriate
security measures based on risk assessment, 100 designate a person to be in
charge of the Information Security Program, 101 and establish an incident
response plan. 102 The NAIC Model Law provides more guidance regarding
investigation and notification that do not exist in the NYDFS regulations,
including what determinations need to be made during the investigation
and what information to provide the commissioner. 103 Notification is
required “in no event later than 72 hours from a determination that a
Cybersecurity Event has occurred” and one of two criteria has been
met. 104 The notification must occur if the state is the state of domicile for
the company, or if there is reasonable belief that “the Nonpublic
Information involved is of 250 or more Consumers residing in this State”
and either notice is required to be provided to another government body,
self-regulatory, or supervisory body; or the event “has a reasonable
likelihood of materially harming” a consumer resident to the state or
“[a]ny material part of the normal operation(s).” 105 The requirement to
report within 72 hours after a determination has been made and the
materiality language are the same as the requirements in the NYDFS
regulations. The significant difference is that for Nonpublic Information,
250 consumers in the state must be involved before the notification
Kosseff, supra note 47, at 443.
NAIC MODEL LAW § 4(D)(1).
100
Id. § 4(D)(2).
101 Id. § 4(C)(1).
102 Id. § 4(H).
103 Id. § 5, 6(B).
104 Id. § 6(A).
105 Id. § 6(A)(2).
98
99
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requirement 106is triggered. Additionally, the NAIC Model Law requires
that notification be made to customers per the relevant state law, while the
NYDFS regulation is silent on such notifications.
C. Other States
The states of South Carolina, Michigan, Ohio, Mississippi,
Connecticut, Delaware, and New Hampshire have followed New York by
passing their own cybersecurity regulations overseeing the insurance
industry. The South Carolina Insurance Data Security Act was signed into
law on May 9, 2018, by the governor and is “the first in the nation to pass
this important and timely legislation which is modelled after the NAIC
Insurance Data Security Model Law.” 107 The South Carolina Department
of Insurance aims to work “closely with the NAIC in an effort to ensure
consistency among the states as this legislation is enacted.” 108 Ohio’s
version went into effect in March 2019. 109 The Michigan law was signed
by the Governor on December 28, 2018. Mississippi’s was signed into law
in April 2019. 110 Connecticut passed its Insurance Data Security law as part
of its omnibus budget bill on June 26, 2019, while Delaware and New
Hampshire enacted their laws within days of each on July 31, 2019, and
August 2, 2019, respectively. 111
All seven states follow the NAIC’s definition of a Cybersecurity Event,
but Michigan adds further exemptions in its law. The definition does not
include “[t]he unauthorized access to data by a person” if “[t]he person
Id. § 6(C).
Raymond G. Famer, South Carolina Department of Insurance, Bulletin Number 20182: South Carolina Insurance Data Security Act: 2018 SC Act No. 171, June 14, 2018.
108 Id.
109 Jennifer Orr Mitchell & Jared M. Bruce, Ohio Enacts New Cybersecurity Requirements for
Insurers, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 22, 2019), www.natlawreview.com/article/ohio-enacts-newcybersecurity-requirements-insurers.
110 Sara Merken, States Imposing New Cybersecurity Requirements on Insurers, BLOOMBERG L.
(Apr. 5, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/statesimposing-new-cybersecurity-requirements-on-insurers.
111 Mitchell R. Harris, Connecticut Adopts Insurance Data Security Law: What You Need To
Know, MONDAQ (July 23, 2019), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/828652/
Security/Connecticut+Adopts+Insurance+Data+Security+Law+What+You+Need+T
o+Know; see also Malia K. Rogers, Gregory Szewczyk & Philip N. Yannella, Delaware and
New Hampshire Join Growing List of States With New Insurance Data Security Laws, NAT’L L.
REV. (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/delaware-and-newhampshire-join-growing-list-states-new-insurance-data-security-laws.
106
107

34

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

acted in good faith in accessing the data” and “the access was related to
the activities of the person.” 112 The first element appears to allow for
accidental or innocent access of the data, and the second element appears
to mean that if it was done in the course of the person’s lawful activities,
the incident would not be a Cybersecurity Event. It is unclear what the
motivation is for exempting these two scenarios where the access is still
unauthorized. If the person were able to gain access without
authorization, it would be useful for this breach to be documented and a
response be initiated by the company to ensure that similar vulnerabilities
in the system could not be exploited by hackers in the future. Notifying
the state insurance commissioner of the breach would also aid in this
process.
For notification to the insurance commissioner, South Carolina, like
the NYDFS regulations and NAIC Model Law, mandates that it be done
no later than 72 hours after a determination has been made. 113 Ohio,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Delaware allow for three business days
after a determination, 114 and Michigan requires the notification be made
within ten business days after a determination. 115 Contrary to the clock
starting when a determination of a Cybersecurity Event has occurred,
Connecticut requires that notification be effected within “three business
days after the date of the cybersecurity event.” 116 Surprisingly, Mississippi,
Ohio, and Michigan specifically only require the insurer to notify the
insurance commissioner for Cybersecurity Events that involve Nonpublic
Information. Cybersecurity Events where the infrastructure is attacked
would not require notification. This distinction does not exist in the
NYDFS regulations, the NAIC Model Law, or South Carolina law, where
notification is required for all attacks defined as a Cybersecurity Event,
provided the other criteria for notification are met. Not requiring the
notification of the commissioner of Cybersecurity Events targeting the
Information System itself, or the infrastructure, also means that potentially
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.553(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2018).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-99-40(A) (2018).
114 Act of July 31, 2019, § 1, (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 8606(a)
(2019); Act of April 3, 2019, § 6(1), 2019 Miss. Laws 14 (establishing the insurance data
security law); Act of Aug. 5, 2019, ch. 420-P:6(I), 2019 N.H. Laws 8 (to be codified at
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-P(6)(I); Act of Mar. 20, 2019, § 1, § 3965.04(A), 2019 Ohio
Laws 22.
115 Act of Dec. 28, 2018, § 559(1), 2019 Mich. Pub. Acts.
116 Public Act No. 19-117, § 230(e)(1), 2019 Conn. Acts 5 [Reg.] Sess.
112
113
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significant damages would not have to be reported, as attacks on the
infrastructure could lead to critical failures in the entire insurance industry
that cripple its operations, which are matters that go beyond the
unauthorized sharing of data. The emphasis on data and privacy in the
Mississippi, Ohio, and Michigan laws miss the point of a holistic view of
cybersecurity. 117
The amendment in Michigan to allow for ten days for notification is
overly generous, considering that a flexible time period is already built into
the law to allow for the attacked company to make a determination that
the incident was indeed a Cybersecurity Event before notification per the
earlier discussion. If the purpose of notification to the insurance
commissioner is to ensure that vital information that could be useful to
other insurers or other stakeholders is shared, a ten-day timeframe would
defeat the purpose. Prompt notification to the commissioner would allow
the office to determine whether it is just one of multiple attacks on
different insurers, and whether a warning to other insurers would be
necessary. 118 This warning could include the vulnerabilities being exploited
and could help other insurers make adjustments to their systems if the
warning were timely. By contrast, Connecticut has been the lone state to
tighten the notification time period by setting it within three days of the
occurrence of the attack. Starting the clock at occurrence eliminates the
possibility of the company dragging its feet in its investigation by not
officially making a determination. The time period also facilitates swift
responses to be implemented not only by the company directly affected,
but also by the insurance commissioner who would be notified shortly
after the occurrence. Connecticut’s provision does raise the issue of what
would happen if the attack is discovered more than three days after it first
started: a possible point of contention that would require clarification by
the state insurance commissioner.
While these states all claim to have passed their insurance cybersecurity
laws following the NAIC Model Law, it appears that some critical
deviations in the regulations of Mississippi, Michigan, and Ohio would
expose vulnerabilities and will not entirely accomplish the mission of these
laws. There is no legitimate reason for only mandating notification for one
Kosseff, supra note 47, at 443.
The New York Department of Financial Services stated that in response to notices of
Cybersecurity Events, it “may identify from the information provided a circumstance or
trend that subject to confidentiality warrants providing certain information to other
regulated entities regarding a potential threat.” Vullo, supra note 22, at 2.
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kind of Cybersecurity Event, and there is no logical reason the insurer
would need ten days after determining an attack occurred before notifying
the insurance commissioner. In fact, the clock can start at the occurrence
rather than the determination of the attack. These differences make the
states’ claims they were following the NAIC Model Law spurious because
they fundamentally change the requirements and criteria for notification,
one of the key aspects of these regulations.
D. Need for Harmonization
The above discussion has shown that some states have begun to take
cybersecurity issues in the insurance industry seriously. Other states will
surely follow suit and enact their own laws, but the question remains as to
whether they will devise unique provisions or learn from the field of
existing provisions.
While the NAIC has released its Model Law hoping all states would
have identical or substantially similar legislation concerning regulating
cybersecurity in the insurance industry, states have not been reluctant to
amend the NAIC Model Law to weaken its provisions. This is in addition
to the inclusion of the safe harbor provision in the NAIC Model Law on
the definition of a Cybersecurity Event that already made it less stringent
than the NYDFS regulations. The disparity among the laws means that
insurers that operate in multiple states may have to abide by each state’s
different regulations and expend more time and effort to be compliant.
However, this is not the most significant issue. More important, the
haphazard patchwork of regulations introduces gaps in the cybersecurity
of the insurance industry in the United States, which is undoubtedly all
interconnected.
The NAIC and the federal government, due to their purported
influence, should advocate for more cooperative efforts between states,
not only in harmonizing the laws on paper, but also foster practical
collaborations so there is communication among the state insurance
regulatory agencies. The insurance departments should provide guidance
to further clarify the regulations that might be subject to interpretation,
such as whether multiple assaults can be considered one Cybersecurity
Event, as discussed earlier. Without clarification, insurers may interpret the
provision differently, resulting in their being held to inconsistent standards
and possibly jeopardizing the industry’s cyber resilience. The sharing of
information may help insurers learn from each other about vulnerabilities
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or modes of attack so they can plan ahead and take measures to enhance
the strength of their systems. 119 After all, what is the point of notification
of past breaches if they cannot serve as lessons for the future? Further, in
the long run, as the Treasury Department has intimated, it is necessary for
the federal government to step in and adopt a single law on cybersecurity
for the insurance industry due to the unlikelihood of uniform laws being
adopted across the United States, despite the existence of the NAIC
Model Law. 120 One way to do this is to empower the Federal Insurance
Office to coordinate a national cybersecurity strategy so there is
uniformity across the country. 121 The need for harmonization is clear
because even with only 10% of the states adopting some kind of measure
for insurance industry cybersecurity thus far, significant variance already
exists.
Whatever route is taken, the safe harbor provision which exempts
notifications if Nonpublic Information is encrypted and the key is not
taken at the same time, should be eliminated. Whether notice is required
should be risk-based, meaning it should be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis and be mandated when the risk of further damage is high, instead
of being subject to a blanket safe harbor provision that is included in all
the regulations herein save the NYDFS regulations. While the NYDFS
regulations is already a watered-down version of its original proposal, it is
Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 986, 1028-30 (2018); Kathryn
E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data Breach Notification Law, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 360 (2006).
120 Gloria Gonzalez, Treasury Recommends Revamping Federal Insurance Office, Adopting Uniform
Cyber Rules, BUSINESS INSURANCE (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.businessinsurance.com/
article/20171027/NEWS06/912316842/Treasury-recommends-revamping-FederalInsurance-Office,-adopting-uniform-cyber-r.
121 French, supra note 37, at 67–70 (arguing that the Federal Insurance Office, which was
established under the Department of the Treasury by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, can work together with the state insurance
regulators to provide a dual track insurance regulation scheme); see Randall, supra note 9,
at 664–86 for arguments for the continuing dominance of state insurance regulation. See
Jacqueline May Tom, A Simple Compromise: The Need for a Federal Data Breach Notification
Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1569, 1592-602 (2010) (arguing for a federal law with strict
notification requirements that preempts state laws); see also Dana J. Lesemann, Once More
unto the Breach: An Analysis of Legal, Technological, and Policy Issues Involving Data Breach
Notification Statutes, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 203, 236–37 (2010). But see Sara A. Needles,
The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based Approach to Data Breach Notification Law, 88
N.C. L. REV. 267, 308–09 (2009) (warning against federal regulation and arguing that
“allowing the market to correct the data breach problem state-by-state is the best way to
ensure that the level of rigor is properly calibrated.”).
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still significantly stronger than the NAIC Model Law and the laws in the
other states. Should there be any effort to harmonize the laws in the
United States, the NYDFS regulations should serve as the foundation
rather than the NAIC Model Law, which is not as robust as it could be to
protect the country’s insurance industry.
V. Conclusion
Cybersecurity is obviously a major concern for the insurance industry.
State insurance departments have recently begun to take the issue seriously
by regulating insurer’s behaviour prior to and after Cybersecurity Events.
New York paved the way with its law, and the NAIC subsequently released
the NAIC Model Law. Nonetheless, the purported adoption of the NAIC
Model Law in a handful of states have already created different standards
that insurers operating in multiple states would have to comply. In order
to achieve security across the board and uniform cyber resilience in the
American insurance industry, harmonization of the regulatory measures
must be strived for, based on the NYDFS regulations, as cybersecurity is
only as strong as its weakest link.

